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Theoretical and Applied Economics
No. 2 / 2011 (555)

Adverse Selection Models with Three States of Nature

Daniela MARINESCU
Bucharest Academy of Economic Studies
Dumitru MARIN
Bucharest Academy of Economic Studies

Abstract. In the paper we analyze an adverse selection model with three states of nature, where both the Principal and the Agent are risk neutral. When solving the model, we use the informational rents and the efforts as variables. We derive the optimal contract in the situation of asymmetric information. The paper ends with the characteristics of the optimal contract and the main conclusions of the model.

Keywords: adverse selection; asymmetric information; informational rent; optimal contract.

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The Confusion of Methods
Marin Dinu

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