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Theoretical and Applied Economics
No. 1 / 2021 (626), Spring

My colleague is corrupt: Information disclosure to control corruption

Indervir SINGH
Central University of Himachal Pradesh, India
Ashapurna BARUAH
Akal University, India

Abstract. The paper argues that the co-workers of a corrupt public official are in the best position to provide proof of corruption. It, with the help of a game-theoretic model, discusses the incentive structure that will allow a co-worker to disclose the information on a corrupt public servant. The study argues that incentives for the co-worker may work best if they are based on the cost of disclosing the information and are contingent upon successfully proving corruption.

Keywords: corruption; co-worker; information disclosure.

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