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Theoretical and Applied Economics
No. 6 / 2011 (559)

Optimal Licensing Contracts with Adverse Selection and Informational Rents

Bucharest Academy of Economic Studies
Dumitru MARIN
Bucharest Academy of Economic Studies

Abstract. In the paper we analyse a model for determining the optimal licensing contract in both situations of symmetric and asymmetric information between the license’s owner and the potential buyer. Next we present another way of solving the corresponding adverse selection model, using the informational rents as variables. This approach is different from that of Macho-Stadler and Perez-Castrillo.

Keywords: optimal contract; innovation; adverse selection; informational rents.

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