Theoretical and Applied Economics
No. 6 / 2011 (559)
Optimal Licensing Contracts with Adverse Selection and Informational Rents
Daniela MARINESCU
Bucharest Academy of Economic Studies
Dumitru MARIN
Bucharest Academy of Economic Studies
Bucharest Academy of Economic Studies
Dumitru MARIN
Bucharest Academy of Economic Studies
Abstract. In the paper we analyse a model for determining the optimal licensing contract in both situations of symmetric and asymmetric information between the license’s owner and the potential buyer. Next we present another way of solving the corresponding adverse selection model, using the informational rents as variables. This approach is different from that of Macho-Stadler and Perez-Castrillo.
Keywords: optimal contract; innovation; adverse selection; informational rents.
Download the full article: 
Contents
Marin Dinu
- The Impact of Sovereign Credit Ratings
on the Issuance of Government Bonds
in Central and Eastern Europe
Ion STANCU
Ana-Maria MINESCU
- Optimal Licensing Contracts with Adverse Selection and Informational Rents
Daniela MARINESCU
Dumitru MARIN
- Morality, Ethics and True Image in Business Accounting
Ionel BOSTAN
Carmen COSTULEANU
Emil HOROMNEA
Marcel COSTULEANU
- Intra-Industry Trade in Tourism Services
Nuno Carlos LEITÃO
- Operational Risk Modeling
Gabriela ANGHELACHE
Ana Cornelia OLTEANU
- Trends in Trade and Investment Flows
between the EU and the BRIC Countries
Iulia Monica OEHLER-ŞINCAI
- The Evaluation of the Competitiveness State
of Manufacturing Companies in Romania –
an Approach According to Mereuţă Model
Daniela Livia TRAŞCĂ
- The Birth of the Regulated Company
in the Macroeconomic Environment
Alexandru BODISLAV
- FDI in the Service Sector – Propagator of Growth for India?
Chitrakalpa SEN
- The Economic Theory and the Global Crisis,
between Theoretical Solutions
and the Economic Reality
Nicolae MOROIANU
Daniel BELINGHER
