Abstract. The article analyses the optimal financial contracts with several types of agents, studying the situation of informational symmetry (symmetrical information) and the situation of informational asymmetry (asymmetric information). In the situation of informational symmetry, the equilibrium point between the principal (decision maker, for example the bank) and the agent (a natural or legal person) is determined, respectively the optimal transfer (rate) and the optimal amount that the agent can borrow. The two main characteristics of the contract are highlighted, represented by the situation of Pareto efficiency (Pareto optimality) and the situation in which the Agent obtains exactly the minimum threshold reserved by the market. In the situation of informational asymmetry, it is solved with the help of informational rents and the solution is compared with the first rank solution, where we have symmetrical information. The characteristics of the contract are highlighted, namely the situation in which the efficiency of Pareto is kept only for the efficient agent who obtains an informational rent. For the other agents, the solution is no longer Pareto - optimal. Following the described analysis, models will be obtained that are classified in relation to the types of agent: rich, good payers or not and good professionals.

Keywords: financial contracts, agents, information symmetry, balance, market.