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Theoretical and Applied Economics
No. 10 / 2011 (563)

Optimal Licensing Contracts with Three Innovation Types

Bucharest Academy of Economic Studies
Dumitru MARIN
Bucharest Academy of Economic Studies

Abstract. In the paper we analyze the features of the optimal licensing contracts in the situation of asymmetric information between the license’s owner and the potential buyer. The approach is based on a classical model of adverse selection first proposed by Macho-Stadler and Perez-Castrillo (1991) and solved in an alternative way, using the informational rents as variables, by Marinescu and Marin (2011). Their model is extended in the present paper by assuming that the adverse selection parameter can have one of three possible values (corresponding to three possible types of innovations).

Keywords: optimal contract; innovation; adverse selection; informational rents.

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